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`conduit' to seek a greater political role. For one thing, such a role under the U.N., would not 
arouse the suspicions of other nations. Secondly, the U.N. tag would help the Japanese 
government steer clear of the usual domestic resentment to any expanded role overseas. But 
in reality, the Japanese government under Miyazawa Kiichi had to make political 
compromises with some of the opposition parties to get the peace-keeping legislation passed 
in the Japanese Diet. Thirdly, Tokyo knew that it would have to make a `tangible human 
contribution' to Cambodian peace. 
   Japan's contribution to the successful Completion of the UNTAC was complimented by 
the U.N. Japan convened two international conferences (1992 and 1994) for the economic 
reconstruction of Cambodia and made its own substantial financial contribution. Th ugh he 
situation in Cambodia is still somewhat fluid, Japan has now resumed its normal relations 
with Vietnam. Indochina as a whole is well-poised for greater economic interaction with 
Japan. Tokyo now advocates closer political and economic linkages between ASEAN and 
Indochina.
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   Japan's role in regional conflict-resolution has often been viewed as passive, gaining no 
appreciation from the international community. Throughout the postwar period, the US-Japan 
Security Treaty has so successfully ensured Japan's national security that there is almost no 
need for Japan to play an active political-security role. But as many changes have taken place 
in recent years, commonly called the post-Cold War changes, the above characterization of 
Japan's role is no longer accurate. We can see this in Japan's roles in the case of the 
Cambodian problem. The Cambodian problem had seriously affected peace and security in the 
region. Its solution demanded the involvement of almost all major powers, including the 
United Nations. In the conflict-resolution efforts of this complicated problem, Japan has 
contributed in various ways: diplomatic mediation, sending military personnel to join the 
United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the reconstruction of postwar Cambodia. Since 
1990, Japan's roles have included the following: 
   1. Organizing the Tokyo Meeting on Cambodia during June 4-5, 1990 inviting the 
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conflicting Cambodian parties to a peace talk in Tokyo. 
   2. Proposing a dialogue on security problems to the participants of the ASEAN-Post 
Ministerial Conference in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991. The first ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) organized in Bangkok in July 1994 has its origin in the above proposal made by 
Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama. 
   3. Enacting a law to make it possible to dispatch military personnel overseas to 
participate in the UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). The first PKO team was sent to 
Cambodia in September and October 1992. 
   4. Hosting several conferences to assist Cambodia's reconstruction and the so-called 
Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina in 1993-1994. The crucial meeting of 
the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) was held in Tokyo 
in March 1994. 
   The purpose of this paper is to present another view about Japan's role in regional-
conflict resolution arguing that Japan's role was active and contributing. The Cambodian 
problem is taken as the case study. True, there were difficulties in its attempts, but in 
retrospect, Japan's role in the Cambodian peace process was contributing and completing the 
full cycle of conflict-resolution: diplomatic mediation, cooperation with the United Nations' 
peacekeeping operations, and postwar economic reconstruction. 
   Foreign Minister Nakayama's proposal was aimed at enhancing "the sense of security" 
among countries. It did not have a direct bearing on the Cambodian peace settlement. We 
shall devote our attention to the three roles mentioned above. Before doing that, let us have a 
review of the Cambodian problem, especially its complexity that made it difficult for any 
comprehensive solution. 
The Cambodian Problem 
   The Cambodian problem has been an extremely complex issue. This is due partly to a 
lack of legitimacy to rule the country by the two largest fighting forces: the Khmer Rouge and 
the Phnom Penh government under Prime Minister Hun Sen. 
   The Khmer Rouge came to power along with the fall of Saigon in 1975. Unlike their 
Vietnamese counterpart, the Khmer Rouge government did not rule the country smoothly. It 
committed genocide killing as many as, according to one source, two million people during its 
three-year rule until December 1975. The new government that ruled the country suffered a 
legitimacy crisis as well when it was viewed by the the international community as a puppet 
regime installed by Vietnam after the Vietnamese forces invaded and occupied Cambodia. It 
was the resistance coalition comprised of the forces of the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk 
and Mr. Son San that was recognized as the legitimate government by the international 
community. The six ASEAN governments joined forces to isolate the Phnom Penh 
government while they continued to recognize the coalition government under Prince 
Sihanouk.
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    After a very long period of occupation, almost 11 years of garrisoning troops, and amidst 
dwindling military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union, Vietnam decided to 
withdraw its troops from Cambodia in late 1989. This made the Vietnam-installed Phnom 
Penh regime claim more legitimacy to rule the country, in addition to its de facto control of 
power for over a decade. On the other hand, the coalition government under Prince Sihanouk 
began to suffer from its claim of sole representation of Cambodia. Among those countries that 
started reviewing their Cambodian policies in the light of changing post-Cold War security 
environment were Thailand under Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan and Japan. Policy-
makers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo had long been looking for some roles to 
play in accelerating the Cambodian peace process. Their first attempt was in mediatory 
diplomacy. 
Japan's Role in Mediatory Diplomacy 
   Japan has limited experience in playing a role of mediator in international conflict-
resolution. In 1991, the Japanese governsment mediated in the French-Indochina conflict 
between Thailand and France, inviting the conflicting parties to Tokyo. Additional mediatory 
diplomacy was attempted in the early 1960's trying to bring to an end to the Indonesia-
Malaysia conflict, the "crush Malaysia" policy of President Sukarno. The attempt failed 
completely. The representatives of Indonesia and Malaysia did arrive in Tokyo, mediation 
was carried out, but it ended up in total failure. It was generally explained that the Japanese 
attempt, despite its good intentions, failed because of a lack of information and understanding 
of the issue and naivete in the art of mediation, especially the timing of intervention in the 
conflict. 
   The mediation in the Cambodian conflict was much more carefully prepared. The 
representatives of the conflicting parties were invited to Tokyo on June 4-5, 1990, but four 
months before that, a fact-finding mission was sent to Cambodia. 
   In February 1990, the Director of the First Southeast Asia Division, Mr. Masaharu Kono, 
was sent to Cambodia. He carried a private passport spending a week during 15-22 February 
observing the political situation in Cambodia and meeting a number of important members of 
the government of President Heng Samrin. Reportedly, Mr. Kono decided not meet Prime 
Minister Hun Sen. From Cambodia he went to Vietnam to join the Director-General of the 
Asian Affairs Bureau who was in Vietnam at that time. Upon returning to Tokyo, Mr. Kono 
made a number of policy recommendations to the Ministry. He recommended that more 
importance should be given to the Phnom Penh government under Prime Minister Hun Sen, 
since it was firmly in control of the overwhelming majority of the territory and population. 
The Phnom Penh government was independent of Vietnam and it had a policy of economic 
openness and reform. On the other hand, the Khmer Rouge was much hated by the Cambodian 
people more than generally understood in the outside world. 
   The above fact-finding and policy recommendations paved the groundwork for the Tokyo 
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Meeting on Cambodia during June 4-5, 1990. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to 
establish a position of downgrading the importance of the Khmer Rouge and placing more 
importance on the Phnom Penh government. With this approach in mind, Tokyo wanted to 
invite Prime Minister Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk to discuss the future of Cambodia and 
the procedures to bring a decade-long conflict to an end. Because of Prince Sihanouk's 
insistence, the representatives of- the other two members of the resistance coalition were 
invited to attend the meeting in Tokyo. 
   To avoid conflict with the ASEAN approach on the Cambodian problem, which had 
consistently recognized the coalition government under Prince Sihanouk, Tokyo was looking 
for an invitation from a certain country to go ahead with the idea of organizing the meeting. 
Tokyo found the answer in Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan who had earlier started 
rapproachement with the Phnom Penh government. In April 1990, during his visit to Tokyo, 
Prime Minister Chatichai suggested to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan to organize a 
meeting on Cambodia in Tokyo. It is possible that the idea came from the Japanese side first 
at the lower official level, but it could as well be characterized as "the meeting of minds" 
between both sides. Throughout the two-day meeting, General Chalvalit Yongchaiyudh, the 
Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, was sent to assist the Japanese host in 
the mediation. Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan also sent his foreign policy advisors to 
assist the Japanese chief mediator. It was the Prime Minister's advisors who contacted the 
conflicting Cambodian parties about going to Tokyo, possibly at the request of the officials of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. But again, the Thai side was no less enthusiastic in 
initiating a new approach to the Cambodian peace settlement. Earlier in January 1989, Prime 
Minister Hun Sen was invited to visit Bangkok as the "personal friend" of Prime Minister 
Chatichai Choonhavan. 
   The Tokyo Meeting on Cambodia accelerated the peace process in the way that the 
Khmer Rouge was downgraded from its earlier position and the Phnom Penh government was 
given more importance to decide the future course of Cambodia. The Joint Communique 
stipulated that a Supreme National Council (SNC) should be established and, "The SNC shall 
be composed of equal numbers of prominent personalities from both parties...". This meant 
that one half of the seats in the SNC would be represented by the Phnom Penh government. 
The remaining half were to be shared by the three party-coalition under Prince Sihanouk. 
This new approach and power-sharing formulae, in the views of the Japanese mediator, was a 
more realistic one, both in terms of reflecting reality and practicality towards the final peace 
settlement. 
    In the views of the Khmer Rouge, however, this was an attempt to downgrade its earlier 
position from a one-fourth power-sharing status to only one-third of the remaining half of the 
SNC. Being aware of this aim in the mind of the Japanese mediator, Mr. Khieu Samphan, the 
Khmer Rouge representative, only attended the photo-taking session at the opening ceremony. 
He repeatedly refused to attend the two-day meeting despite persuasion from both the host and 
the host's "advisors" from Thailand. Mr. Khieu Samphan adamantly refused to sign the 
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completed joint Communique. Apart from the new power-sharing formulae, the Joint 
Communique also mentioned the cease fire as a step towards the final solution. But without 
the Khmer Rouge's acceptance, the Tokyo Meeting did not represent a success in bringing the 
two largest fighting forces to reconciliation. The Tokyo Meeting, however, did chart a new 
course of peace settlement by bringing Prince Sihanouk and Mr. Hun Sen to the forefront to 
work together in the years to follow. 
   Actually, the Tokyo Meeting was a small mirror, reflecting the larger picture of 
Cambodian conflict-resolution two years later. Following the Paris Peace Accords of October 
1991, a general election was held in May 1993 under the United Nations' supervision. The 
Khmer Rouge refused to participate in the election. It was left outside in the cold of further 
isolation when the post-election government was formed by Prince Sihanouk and Mr. Hun 
Sen's political parties. In July 1994, the Khmer Rouge was declared outlawed and it decided 
to form its own government. 
Japan's Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations 
   The process of passing a PKO law had been extremely time-consuming, reflecting the 
Japanese public's distrust of the use of armed personnel in regional conflict-resolution. The 
first PKO bill, was submitted to the Diet in October 1990, but became null in November after 
facing resistance from the opposition parties and criticism from the general public. A revised 
PKO bill was submitted to the Diet in September 1992, almost a year after the first submittal. 
After fierce battles in the Diet, including the so-called ox-walking tactics used by the largest 
opposition party, the bill was finally enacted in June 1992. With the clearance of the 
legislative barrier, the Miyazawa government, formed in early November 1991, started sending 
PKO personnel to Cambodia in September 1992. In October the main body of the first 
dispatch of the engineering battalion left Japan and engaged in road reconstruction and other 
public works. 
   Japan's role in regional conflict-resolution in terms of sending military personnel was 
perhaps the greatest contribution from the Japanese government's point of view. Diplomatic 
mediation and development assistance were not as difficult as this one. The Japanese publics 
distrust of anything involving sending uniformed military personnel overseas was extremely 
deep. It took much time for the public to come to terms with that decision. To pass the bill, it 
took three Diet sessions, including as many as 90 hours of debate in the Lower House and 
over 100 hours in the Upper House. There were voices of opposition from neighboring 
countries, including a critical remark from the Senior Minister of Singapore. Mr. Lee Kuan 
Yew criticized the move by saying that this might be like "giving liqueur chocolates to an 
alcoholic". But the Japanese government was determined to make the contribution realizing 
that there would be more criticism if Japan did not. The lesson from the Gulf War was too 
costly for Japan: paying 11 million dollars to the multilateral forces, but gaining no 
appreciation and recognition. 
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   In order to seek support from the general public and cooperation from the moderate 
opposition parties, a number of restrictions were stipulated in the law, officially called Law 
Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations. 
The most important restriction is that the total number of personnel sent to a specific UN 
request must not exceed 2,000 troops. The personnel actually dispatched to Cambodia 
included some 600 military officers, an engineering battalion, and a small number of civilian 
officers comprised mostly of policemen. The second restriction is that the PKO personnel can 
not be sent unless there is a ceasefire agreement and the conflicting parties accept the 
Japanese dispatch. Third, in carrying out their operations, the Japanese PKO personnel can 
only use light arms for self-defense purposes. This restriction resulted in their inability to 
defend themselves upon attack, which actually took place when the Khmer Rouge shot one 
Japanese police officer dead. Finally, no fighting forces such as infantry, artillery and 
armored (tank) units can be dispatched. The use of these forces, called Peace Keeping Forces 
(PKF), was mentioned in the Law but it was frozen for the time being. 
   Under these restrictions, the Japanese engineering battalion and other civilian officers 
helped construct and repair roads, bridges and other infra-structure. They also assisted 
UNTAC in supervising the general-election in May 1993. They returned to Japan after the 
election and the new government was formed in September the same year. Had Japan failed to 
dispatch military personnel to take part in the UN-PKO, according to the Paris Peace 
Accords, Japan's role in regional conflict resolution would have been incomplete. 
Japan's Role in Postwar Reconstruction 
   As the Cambodian peace process was drawing to a close, Japan began to play a role of 
reconstructing the wartorn Cambodia. The Paris Agreements of October 1991 and the general 
election in May 1992 signalled to the Japanese government that now it was time to play the 
long awaited role in rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia and the overall 
development of Indochina. 
   Japan's response came quickly. In June 1992, Japan hosted the Ministerial Conference on 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRRC) in Tokyo. Participating 
governments and international organizations made a pledge of UR$ 880 million to assist war-
torn Cambodia. The Japanese government alone made a pledge of 150-200 million, about one-
fifth of the total. In November the same year, the Japanese government decided to offer a 
commodity loan package of 45.5 billion yen to Vietnam to assist Vietnam's economic 
openness and reform program. 
   In the following year, Japan hosted a crucial conference on Indochina development. The 
so-called Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina, held in Tokyo on December 
9-10, 1993, was organized as promised earlier by Prime Minister Miyazawa in his policy 
speech delivered in Bangkok in January, 1993. Representatives from 22 governments and 6 
international organizations participated in the forum to express their willingness to assist and 
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coordinate their assistance programs to the three Indochinese states. After this meeting at the 
senior official level, a ministerial meeting was expected to be held in Tokyo again in the 
following year. According to one official in charge of this meeting at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Tokyo, the purpose of this meeting was to convince donor countries to maintain 
their interests in assisting postwar-Indochina's reconstruction. 
   During March 10-11, 1994, Japan made a great effort to host a conference in order to 
mobilize funds for the reconstruction of Cambodia, the International Committee on the 
Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), an organization established by the MCRRC mentioned 
above. France had taken the leadership first in organizing the ICORC meeting and Japan took 
its turn to organize the second one. Japan did its best to make the meeting successful. 
Representatives from as many as 32 countries (including Japan and Cambodia) and 12 
international organizations, including several non-government organizations (NGO's) were 
invited. The pledges made for the year 1994 reached US$ 486 million and US$ 271 million 
for the year 1995, including another US$ 15 million for demining works, reaching a total of 
US$ 773 million. As for Japan, a pledge of US$ 87 million in grant assistance and US$ 1.6 
million for tripartite cooperation among Japan-ASEAN-Cambodia through the United Nations' 
Development Program (UNDP) was made for the year 1994. In addition to this, another US$ 
2.5 million was offered for demining works. The total pledge made by Japan reached US$ 
91.8 million, about one-fifth of the total pledges made at the meeting, the largest single 
pledge made by any government. 
Conclusion 
   Peace and stability in the region surrounding Japan was regarded by foreign policy-
makers in Japan as a national goal to ensure national security. While maintaining the US-
Japan security arrangement, Japan began to play a more active political-security role as the 
Cold War confrontation came to an end around the year 1990. This was clearly seen in 
Japan's roles in the Cambodian problem. In 1990 Japan attempted to mediate by inviting the 
coflicting parties to a peace talk in Tokyo. In 1992 a law on PKO was enacted and military 
personnel were sent for the first time in postwar history to join the United Nations' 
peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. In 1993 and 1994, Japan hosted several conferences on 
the reconstruction of Cambodia including the Comprehensive Development of Indochina, 
playing a decisive role as flag-carrier to mobilize world attention, support and funds. In a 
larger overall security role, the Japanese Foreign Minister made a bold proposal to ASEAN 
and its dialogue partners to engage in regional security dialogue with a clear agenda. 
   In July 1994, the Nakayama proposal was transformed to the so-called ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) took place for the first time in Bangkok with representatives from, in addition 
to ASEAN and its seven dialogue partners, China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New 
Guinea. As in the case of the Cambodian problem, we can observe Japan's active and 
contributing role, this time in the promotion of transparency and mutual reassurance, leading 
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to what ASEAN commonly refers to as preventive diplomacy. It seems that ARF works and if 
it does, Japan's contributing role here again can not be denied.
  THE ASIAN HUMAN RESOURCE 
APPROACH IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
  William K. CUMMINGS 
State University of New York at Buffalo
   Several recent studies indicate that the educational and research institutions of all 
modern nations are becoming increasingly similar in response to common global economic 
and political forces, and, moreover, that these institutions are taking on an increasingly 
Western form. This paper challenges the prevailing Westernization proposition by asserting 
that several Asian nationsi, radiating from Japan through East Asia and Southeast Asia, have 
and are developing a distinctive approach to human resource development and utilization that 
contrasts in important respects with the Western model. 
   This paper provides a preliminary identification of the core components of the Asian 
approach: (1) the state coordinates education and research with a firm emphasis both on 
indigenous value transmission and the mastery of foreign technology; (2) high priority is 
placed on universal primary education while state investment at the secondary and tertiary 
level is limited primarily to critical areas such as engineering and the sciences; (3) individual 
students, their families, and the private sector are expected to provide critical backup for the 
education provided by the state. (4) The Asian state in seeking to coordinate not only the 
development but also the utilization of human resources involves itself in manpower planning 
and job placement and increasingly in the coordination of science and technology. 
   This paper outlines the sources and nature of the Asian approach; Japan, which virtually 
alone among Asian nations avoided the shackles of Western imperialism, is portrayed as the 
chief initiator and diffuser of the Asian approach. Other Asian states have ranckled at the 
Japanese influence, or as in the recent cases of Singapore and Malaysia announced official 
policies of "Learning from Japan." But the regional processes leading to the emergence of the 
Asian approach are complex, and at this stage, only partially understood. 
   The paper also reflects on several global implications of the Asian approach, including 
social stability and Asia's human resource edge. Two other implications deserve special note: 
   Pacific Rim Connection A third set of implications could be described as the Pacific 
Rim Connection. Over the course of the past three decades, Asian human resources have 
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